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INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this paper is to determine the nature of the causal 
relationship, if any, between membership in formal and informal groups 
and household welfare in South Africa. In the economics literature, the 
extent of household membership in various groups has been used to proxy 
the household's stock of'social capital'. While the concept of'social 
capital' is relatively new to economists, it is well grounded in the 
sociology literature (see Coleman, 1988 for a review) as is the notion that 
social structure conditions economic growth (Granovetter, 1985). The 
entry point for many economists is Putnam's (1993) book on Italian 
regional economic performance and his research in the United States. 
'Social capital refers to features of social organisation such as networks, 
norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and co-operation for 
mutual benefit' (Putnam, 1995:67). 
Two recent studies (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997, Grootaert, 1998) have 
collected survey information on household membership in groups and 
used it to determine the impact of various dimensions of this membership 
on household welfare. Both studies found large, positive, and significant 
impacts of group membership on household welfare. This paper begins by 
replicating the main methods used by these two studies and then extends 
the analysis assessing the impact of social capital over time. This is 
possible because we use a panel data set from KwaZulu-Natal, the most 
populated of South Africa's nine provinces. A key advantage is that the 
panel data set allows us to control for unobserved time - invariant factors 
at the household and community levels. 
Consistent with the above-mentioned studies, we find a positive and 
significant impact of social capital, as measured by characteristics of 
group membership, on per capita total expenditure. However, this impact 
differs over time and is somewhat decreased when one controls for 
household and community fixed effects. For example, after controlling 
for fixed effects, social capital has no impact on per capita expenditure in 
1993 but positive and significant effects in 1998. We interpret this as 
reflecting structural changes in the South African economy over the 
recent period. Also, in contrast to the earlier studies, we find the effects of 
social capital, while large, are generally smaller than the effects of 
education. 
The next section provides a brief review of the rapidly burgeoning 
literature on social capital, with a special reference to South Africa. The 
section summarises the definitions of social capital used in empirical 
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work, the pathways by which social capital is hypothesised to affect 
household welfare, and some of the previous empirical results. The 
following section describes the data used in this study and the subsequent 
section explores the extent of attrition bias in the data, describes the 
changes in welfare and group membership between 1993 and 1998, and 
outlines the construction of the social capital indicator we use. The next 
section presents the estimation results, which attempt to explain per capita 
total expenditure with our proxy for social capital, conditional on a 
number of other factors including human capital. First, we consider 
ordinary least squares regressions separately for the 1993 and 1998 cross 
sections. Second, we pool the two cross-sections, control for household 
(and therefore community) fixed effects, and test for structural shifts in 
the relationship between the two periods. After presenting some 
instrumental variables estimates to control for endogeneity - a major 
concern for our measure of social capital - we explore the impact of initial 
1993 levels of social capital. The final section concludes the paper and 
presents a discussion of improvements that need to be made in future 
work. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOUTH AFRICA 
The identification of the determinants of persistent poverty and 
inequality, and the introduction of policies to address this persistence 
have been identified as priorities by the first democratically elected 
government of South Africa (May et al, 1998a). To achieve this, the 
government committed itself to an agenda of social, political and 
economic transformation through its Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), while simultaneously reducing state expenditure and 
introducing measures to liberalise the economy (ANC, 1994; MoF, 1996). 
An important component of South African anti-poverty policy focuses on 
the provision and accumulation of a wide range of assets to those 
previously disadvantaged by apartheid, along with reforms intended to 
provide opportunities to use these assets. How important an asset is social 
capital in helping households increase their welfare and how might it 
work? 
The three main empirical economics papers on social capital (Narayan 
and Pritchett 1997, Knack and Keefer 1997, and Grootaert, 1998) posit 
similar mechanisms by which social capital is hypothesised to affect 
household welfare. They borrow primarily from the work of Coleman 
(1988), Putnam (1995), and Fukuyama (1995). The hypothesised 
mechanisms by which group membership affects household welfare can 
be summarised as: (1) reductions in the costs of transactions by 
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improving information flows about new opportunities and potential 
shocks, improving the diffusion of innovations, and improving 
knowledge about the comparative performance of local government 
agents, (2) the promotion of consultative decision making as well as 
collective action that minimises negative externalities and promotes the 
production of public goods and (3) the fostering of time-sensitive 
exchanges for mutual benefit by developing norms of civic behaviour, 
trust and reputation dissemination. Moreover, the completion of some of 
these time sensitive exchanges might be triggered by a crisis, allowing 
social capital to perhaps serve as informal insurance. 
Empirically, the household-level studies of Narayan and Pritchett (1997) 
and Grootaert (1998) from Tanzania and Indonesia respectively, find that 
the effect of social capital (as they measure it - we will come to this later) 
on household per capita expenditure is large. Narayan and Pritchett find it 
is 4-10 times as large as the impact of human capital, while Grootaert 
finds it is twice as large. For the latter in Indonesia, a 10 percent increase 
in the measure of social capital is associated with a 1.14 percent increase 
in per capita total expenditure. 
Might we expect social capital to be important for income generation in 
South Africa in 1993 and 1998? Certainly, the notion of social capital has 
some resonance with the traditional South African institution of 'ubuntu'. 
'Ubuntu' is a conceptualisation of humanness that means, 'I am because 
you exist'. It is seen as an expression of community life and collective 
responsibilities and invokes notions of caring for and sharing with each 
other and has been evoked in support of several post-1994 South African 
government and non-government initiatives such as the 'war on poverty' 
declaration of 1998. However, Maluleke (1996) has shown that 'ubuntu' 
had been severely eroded by the enforcement of the pre-1994 apartheid 
legislation with the imposition of institutions designed to ensure the 
political control of African communities. 
Moreover, the recorded rates of almost all types of crime rose 
dramatically in South Africa between 1990 and 1994, with serious crimes 
increasing by between 18 percent and 42 percent. The incidence of crime 
is of direct relevance to the accumulation and erosion of social capital 
(Louw and Shaw, 1997; Maluleke, 1996). Together with the history of 
forced resettlement, high levels of migration and extreme poverty, 
violence completed the undermining of social cohesion in South African 
communities observed during the 1980s (Sharp and Speigel, 1985:144, 
Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). Many communities are divided with little 
commonality in terms of needs and aspirations, a social context which 
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elsewhere has been described as being bereft of stocks of social capital 
(Moser and Holland, 1997:41). We might reasonably conclude from these 
observations that stocks of social capital in 1993 South Africa were low, 
and when not low, the stocks were employed for political and physical 
survival rather than economic advancement. Alternatively, however, 
repression by the state may have stimulated a self-help ethic at the 
household and community level. 
What about social capital and its impact in 1998? There are several 
factors that might lead one to expect stocks of social capital to increase. 
First, the flagship policy of the 1994 government in South Africa, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) explicitly recognises 
the important role to be played by local institutions in the implementation 
of policy. Noting that the apartheid government had left a legacy of a 
fragmented legal and institutional framework lacking the capacity to 
deliver essential services, the RDP places democratisation of the state and 
society as one of its six basic principles (ANC, 1994: 6). In addition to 
enfranchisement, a bill of rights and accountability, the RDP stress that 
'social movements and CBOs (community based organisations) are a 
major asset in the effort to democratise and develop our society' (ANC, 
1994:121). 
As a result, community involvement in the development process is an 
important component from the beginning for several key programs (eg. 
water supply, land reform, and public works) where communities must 
initiate their applications for support. Second, we know that the rates of 
serious crime and politically motivated violence, while still very high 
post-1994, did decline thereafter (Louw and Shaw, 1997). Finally, the 
South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (May et al, 1998b) 
confirms that the theme of isolation or exclusion from social institutions 
is viewed as an important component and determinant of poverty in 
contemporary South Africa. In that report, the poor were often described 
as being isolated from community-level institutions and unable to 
participate in community gardens and other self-help initiatives. 
On the other hand, it is unlikely social capital can be accumulated 
overnight. Morris' (1992:95) discussion of the reproduction of social 
relations in the shantytowns of South Africa is illustrative of the inherited 
social context of poor communities in South Africa. His analysis shows 
how settlements may be bound by socio-economic networks that can be 
hierarchical, contradictory, and caught up in the broader social and 
political context. In addition, rapid social, demographic and economic 
change, as in South Africa over the 1993-98 period can undermine the 
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basis for trust and reciprocal relationships. This has been argued by some 
analysts to lead to the 'erosion' of social capital through the possible 
increased workload of those who traditionally invest in social networks, 
increased spatial mobility such as migration and urbanisation, 
demographic transitions that result in smaller families, and increased 
government and market efficiency which may crowd out or substitute for 
the provision of goods traditionally provided via social networks (Moser, 
1997, Woolcock 1998). 
Finally, social capital does not necessarily have a positive effect on 
household income generation; it can also have negative outcomes. 
Coleman (1988) and others recognise that certain forms of social capital 
may constrain desired actions such as innovation and 'a given form of 
social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless 
or even harmful for others' (Coleman, 1990:598). In particular, 
economies in transition, or those with high levels of inequality, may be 
especially prone to the 'dark side of social capital' and may be trapped in 
a syndrome of distrust, in which cronyism and corruption can flourish 
(Holland, 1998:67; Beall, 1997:960; Putzel, 1997:945). The mechanism 
of trust building, based on the assumption of repeated transactions, may 
fail during transitions where large rents may be captured in first moves 
that are not dependent on reciprocal actions (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1996:20). In addition, Fine (1999) warns against the catch-all view of 
social capital. The embrace of an imprecise discussion of social capital 
may make it easier for governments to be less rather than more 
accountable. Premature arguments about the crowding out of social 
capital by government interventions, it is argued, might make it too easy 
for governments to avoid a legitimate role in public action against 
poverty. 
THE KWAZULU-NATAL INCOME DYNAMICS DATASET 
The first South African national household survey, the Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development, (PSLSD), was 
undertaken in the last half of 1993 by a consortium of South African 
survey groups and universities under the leadership of the Southern 
Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the 
University of Cape Town with financial and technical support from the 
World Bank (PSLSD, 1994). 
Households in KwaZulu-Natal province, on the east coast, were re-
surveyed from March to June, 1998.1 Formed by combining the former 
Zulu homeland and the former Natal province, KwaZulu-Natal is now 
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South Africa's largest province containing 1/5 of a population of 
approximately 40 million. Though not the poorest province, it is 
relatively poor despite being relatively urban (35 percent). It is ethnically 
diverse: 76 percent are African2,14 percent Indian, 7 percent white and 3 
percent coloured. During the mid-1980s and again in the early-1990s 
there was substantial political unrest and violence in KwaZulu-Natal. 
This last feature makes KwaZulu-Natal an especially interesting place to 
study social capital, as it may have been somewhat eroded by the violence 
and unrest during the period (Moser, 1998). 
In 1993, the KwaZulu-Natal sample was representative at the province 
level, conditional on the accuracy of the 1991 census used as the 
sampling frame, and contained 1558 households. It was decided not to re-
survey white and coloured households in 1998. While there were 
advantages to retaining these groups, namely the maintenance of overall 
sample size and the political cover provided by sampling all ethnic groups 
in the province, the sample size of these two sets of households was small 
(112 white and 53 coloured) precluding comparative ethnic analyses. 
Moreover, due to the general lack of spatial integration of the population, 
the households in these groups were entirely located in a small number of 
clusters, which appear to be non-representative at the ethnic group level. 
The sample, then, includes Africans and Indians in both rural and urban 
areas of KwaZulu-Natal province. 
To ensure comparability, the 1998 household questionnaire largely 
followed the 1993 version, an integrated household survey similar in 
design to a World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), 
though there were some important changes. One of these was a greater 
focus on the individual, especially in terms of ownership of assets and 
control over their use. A second underlying change was an expanded 
emphasis on the set of individuals not living in the household but 
economically linked to it. Four new sections were added gathering 
information on economic shocks (both positive and negative), assets 
brought to marriage, household decision making, and group 
memberships. 
The 1998 questionnaire lists nearly twenty different types of groups or 
associations identified through pretesting. These fall into several general 
categories including financial (eg. saving clubs, burial societies), 
production (eg. farmers, informal trader's), sport and music, community 
service committees (school, water, development), religious, and political 
organizations.3 Households indicated whether any individual was a 
member of each type of group in 1998 and/or had been a member of the 
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group five years earlier, in 1993; the identity of all members was 
recorded. (Below we assess the accuracy of the 1993 retrospective 
information.) For (up to four of) the groups the household deemed most 
important, additional information about their characteristics was 
collected. These included questions on different types of fees, the gender 
composition of the group, performance of the group, and the frequency of 
meeting attendance. 
To the extent possible, analogues to the household level questions were 
asked in 69 community level surveys, which were completed by 
interviewing a group of key informants in the community. For each of the 
general categories (eg. financial, religious, etc), the number of groups 
serving the community in 1993 and 1998 was asked. For a subset of these 
deemed the most important in the community, information about the 
group characteristics (eg. gender composition) was collected. 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
This section describes (1) attempts to explore attrition bias between the 
1993-98 rounds, (2) the changes in welfare and group membership 
between 1993 and 1998 and their associations, (3) the quality of the group 
membership recall data for 1993, and (4) the construction of the social 
capital index and its association with levels and changes in per capita 
total expenditure. 
Attrition bias 
A prior question for any analysis using panel data, and particularly 
important in a study examining the dynamics of poverty, is the extent and 
nature of sample attrition. The 1993 (and thus 1998 target) sample 
included 1389 households4, (215 Indian, 1174 African) and 1178 were 
successfully re-interviewed in 1998 (168 Indian, 1010 African) or 85 
percent. This completion rate includes 5 percent who moved but were 
successfully tracked to their new residences and re-interviewed. Of 
course, appealing to a relatively low level of attrition is not sufficient in 
order to claim analysis on the balanced panel is not distorted by attrition; 
one must examine the processes underlying it (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and 
Moffit, 1998). 
Maluccio, Thomas, and Haddad (1999) present a detailed examination of 
attrition in these data. Larger households were more likely to be re-
interviewed but there is little association with 1993 per capita 
expenditures. An important factor determining whether households were 
re-interviewed is the quality of enumeration in 1993, a characteristic 
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unlikely to bias any subsequent estimates that rely on the 1998 
households and individuals. While it is not possible to definitively rule 
out selection bias due to attrition, we interpret this evidence to suggest 
such bias is likely to be small. 
Changes in welfare and group membership for the panel households, 
1993-98 
Over the last five years, while GNP growth in South Africa averaged 
about 2 percent, it turned negative in 1998. Unemployment has steadily 
increased over the same period and the most recent estimates indicate that 
in 1997 nearly Vi of the work force was seeking employment (Klasen and 
Woolard, 1999). Under this background, the dramatic changes during this 
period have been accompanied by changes in household per capita 
expenditures. We begin a description of these changes comparing the 
density functions of real logarithmic per capita expenditures in 1993 and 
19985. This shows a slight flattening of the density over the period 
suggesting marginally increased inequality. 
A primary advantage of panel data, however, is the capacity to describe 
changes over time for the same households, something the density 
functions ignore. Comparison of per capita expenditure levels in the two 
survey years for the same households indicates that there were both 
winners and losers. For example, using these same data, Carter (1999) 
finds that for the sample restricted to only those interviewed in both 
periods, headcount poverty rates appear to have increased over the period 
but fully 1/3 of those classified as poor in 1993 were no longer so in 1998. 
There appears to be significant movement both in and out of poverty. 
Table 1 presents the 1993 - 1998 transition matrix for per capita 
expenditure quintiles. In addition to confirming there is a great deal of 
movement within the distribution, it reveals that no group is immune to 
these changes, although households in the lowest and highest quintiles are 
less likely to have changed category. Nearly 2/3 of the households in the 
lowest quintile in 1993 had moved up in the distribution by 1998. For the 
three middle quintiles, fully % of the households have transited to a 
different quintile. 
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Table 2 
Group Membership in 1993 and 1998 
1993 1998 % Change 
Average % in any Average % in any Groups 
group group 1993 - 1998 
Black Households 0.77 53% 1.35 73% 75% 
(N=1006) 
Indian Households 0.37 33% 0.57 44% 54% 
(N=169) 
All Households 0.71 50% 1.24 69% 75% 
(N=1175) 
Types of Groups 
Percentage of Households belonging to each type 
(N=1175) 
1993 1998 
% % 
Financial 25 54 
Production 2 4 
Service 1 5 
Political 2 4 
Religious 36 44 
Culture/Sport 3 8 
Table 2 presents some basic information on group membership at the 
household level. This measure was constructed by treating the 
membership of any individual or individuals in the same group as a single 
group membership for the household as a whole. As in the other studies 
cited above, this implicitly assumes that having more than one member in 
a group does not increase social capital. In terms of networks, it suggests 
that any household member belonging to the group opens up that group's 
network and additional members do not extend it further. The data 
indicate that households in South Africa are increasingly joining groups. 
On average, each household was a member of 0.8 groups in 1993 and this 
increases by 70 percent to 1.3 in 1998. The types of groups vary but two 
predominate. These are financial groups, which include 'stokvels' or 
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savings clubs and burial societies, which provide insurance for funeral 
costs, and religious organisations. Increases in membership rates are not 
limited to these groups, however, and in terms of growth, membership in 
the groups with far smaller absolute percentages is substantial. 
The Quality of the group membership recall data for 1993 
The finding that group membership increases, and much of the analysis 
below, relies critically on the validity of the retrospective information 
collected in the 1998 survey about 1993. A number of factors suggest that 
these measures are valid. This does not mean, however, that they are 
measured without random error, something we will address further in the 
empirical work. 
When long(er) term recall is required6, its accuracy is enhanced if the 
information is related to some salient event in the respondent's life, for 
example one's wedding. In South Africa, it seems likely that one of the 
most important events in recent (and not so recent) history was the 1994 
national democratic election bringing the African National Congress 
(ANC) and President Nelson Mandela into power. Since the 1993 survey 
was undertaken about six months prior to these elections, interviewers 
were carefully trained to introduce retrospective questions relating to 
1993 with a phrase such as 'just before the first democratic national 
elections.' Therefore, a priori, the retrospective data are likely to be of 
good quality. 
We present three types of empirical evidence that address the question of 
reliability of the recall data. 
a) A comparison of the independently collected community level data 
with the household level data 
b) An examination of the timing of joining groups 
c) An assessment of the apparent reliability of other information in the 
questionnaire 
Collected in key informant group interviews ranging from 2 to 11 
participants in size, the community level surveys provide recall data for 
1993 that is independent of the household questionnaire. On the whole, 
the community level information is consistent with the picture presented 
in the household level data. The number of groups, or 'supply', serving a 
community increases nearly 40 percent (from 12.9 to 17.5 on average). 
Further, in no cases do households report belonging to more groups than 
were identified in the community survey? 
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Using the community level data as a check on the household level data 
assumes, of course, that the former is 'correct.' But it is possible that both 
sources of data are subject to similar retrospective biases. What sorts of 
factors might influence the accuracy of responses and in particular, recall, 
in the community survey? 
One possibility is that the number of respondents in the group interview 
could be important; presumably the more respondents, the greater recall. 
Other factors that might influence recall include the age, gender, and 
education composition of the key informants. To explore these 
possibilities, we regress the total number of groups reported in a 
community in 1993 (and in a separate regression, 1998) on these basic 
characteristics of the key informants (size of group, average education, 
average age, and the proportion of women) and find no statistically 
significant relationships. 
Interviews with more key informants did not tend to report more groups 
in a community, in either year. In addition we implement the same 
specification but with the change in groups between 1993 and 1998 and 
find no significant influences. Therefore, if the retrospective data are 
biased, it is in a fashion unrelated to the size and composition of the key 
informant group. We interpret this to mean they are a reasonable check 
for the household data. 
Notice it is not possible to do a similar analysis at the household level 
because there we might expect age, education, gender, etc. to influence 
being in a group (and not just reporting being in a group). 
A second check on the household level recall data is to look at the pattern 
of joining groups. For the self-reported most important group 
memberships in 1998, the median time an individual was a member is 6 
years. Group membership appears to be rather long term, consistent with 
an observed low risk of exit. Entry rates over time do not exhibit 
bunching with roughly equal percentages entering in each of the five 
years before 1998 and fewer entries prior to that. Again, while we do not 
know the true entry rates, the fact that entry is spread out somewhat 
evenly over the past decade and there is little telescoping of the entry 
rates, suggests that the data are reliable. 
A final piece of evidence to assess the reliability of retrospective data is 
to examine how well time invariant variables were measured in the two 
surveys. There are a few (relatively) time invariant variables for which a 
direct comparison of information collected in 1993 and 1998 can be 
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made; these include education for adults who have completed schooling 
and familial relationships within the household. 
Under the assumption of random measurement error, the correlation 
coefficient between the 1993 and 1998 values for these variables is a 
measure of the reliability ratio7. Even if we were not using retrospective 
data, it would be important to examine these correlations because of the 
well-known problems for estimation using panel data with measurement 
error. 
Mean completed education for resident adults age 30 and over in 1993 
changes very little between the surveys and the reliability ratio is 0.79. 
Consistent identification of one's parents suggest much higher reliability 
ratios, however, of 0.99 for mothers and 0.95 for fathers. These latter 
figures may be partly inflated since interviewers were given basic 
relationship information linking each individual in the household to the 
household head - some of these would be direct children of the head 
possibly reducing error in the re-interview (conditional on the correctness 
of the 1993 information). 
Clearly there is measurement error in any survey, and as suggested above 
it varies by the type of information collected. On balance, while there is 
evidence to suggest that the retrospective group membership information 
is not measured with any systematic bias, we do not expect it to be 
measured without random error; for example, it is unlikely to be better 
measured than years of education. 
Constructing an index of social capital 
Above we described some of the changes in per capita expenditure over 
time and some features of group membership in the data. Are there 
apparent relationships between the two? To begin to assess this, we 
present some aspects of the bivariate relationship between log per capita 
expenditures and an index of social capital. 
In constructing a proxy measure for social capital we follow Narayan and 
Pritchett (1997) and Grootaert (1998) and derive a measure based on the 
characteristics of group membership at the household level. While there 
are weaknesses to this approach, and indeed the data allow further 
refinements, which will be, explored in future research, it has the merit of 
being more directly comparable to the existing literature. 
13 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INCOME GENERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1993-98 
Specifically, the index of social capital is constructed in order to mimic 
that used by Narayan and Pritchett (1997) to the extent possible with 
these data8. It includes three components: 
• density, the number of group memberships 
• gender heterogeneity, percentage of the most important groups which 
are mixed gender 
• performance: the average reported performance of the most important 
groups 
The third component is the response to the question 'Overall, how well do 
you think the group works?' asked both 1993 and 1998 and coded on a 
five point scale with higher scores representing better performance. This 
indicator is re-scaled into five categories assuming it is uniformly 
distributed between 0 and 100. 
As with Narayan and Pritchett (1997) we assume social capital increases 
with higher density, gender heterogeneity, and performance. The index is 
computed by multiplying the three components and then re-scaling it to 
lie between 0 and 100 and is identical to the sum of equally weighted sub-
indices of the characteristics for each group. Since the scaling is arbitrary 
we do not discuss the distribution of the index other than to note that in 
1993 nearly 50 percent of the sample score zero (because they were not 
members of any groups) but this declines to about 30 percent in 1998. 
Table 3 
Social Capital Index and Logarithmic Per Capita Expenditure 
Mean of Social Capital Index 
Bottom 
Decile 
of pee 
Bottom 
Quartile 
of pee 
Top Top 
Quartile Decile 
of pee of pee 
1993 per capita expenditure 13.7 13.9 9.5 8.6 
1998 per capita expenditure 13.6 15.4 16.1 14.6 
1998 - 1993 per capita exp. 9.0 9.3 12.8 12.8 
In Table 3, we begin to explore the relationship between our index of 
social capital and per capita expenditures. Using the format and 
observations from the transition matrix presented in Table 1, each cell 
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contains the average of the 1993 social capital index for observations in 
that cell. Reading from the right hand side total column it appears that the 
1993 social capital index is, if anything, negatively related to per capita 
expenditures in 1993. In 1998, there does not seem to be any relationship 
between the two (bottom row). 
Examining the body of the table, however, suggests that initial 1993 
levels of social capital are higher for the upwardly mobile, i.e., those who 
improved their position in the overall distribution. In sum, while social 
capital, as proxied by this measure of group membership and 
characteristics, does not appear to be positively associated with 
contemporaneous income, initial 1993 levels are associated with changes 
in expenditures. In the analysis, then, we will consider both these sorts of 
effects to the extent possible. 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
We begin with a replication of earlier work that estimates 'standard' 
expenditure functions augmented by the inclusion of measures of social 
capital in the cross section. The base controls include indicators for 
location, race, household size, gender of the head, and age of the head. 
Also included are household level and community average social capital 
indices. These separate regressions, one for 1993 and one for 1998, are 
shown in Table 4. T-statistics are based on robust standard error estimates 
allowing for clustering at the community level (Stata Manual, 1997). 
The results for both years conform to the typical findings in the literature. 
Urban households, households with male heads, households with older 
heads, and more educated households all have higher per capita 
expenditures. Larger households have lower per capita expenditures. 
Conditional on these characteristics including education and location, 
African households still have lower expenditures per capita reflecting, in 
part, the legacy of apartheid. With the exception of an indicator for those 
who lived in the former province of Natal and the 'return' to education, 
the coefficients are remarkably similar across the two time periods. 
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Table 4 
Cross Section Expenditure Functions with Social Capital 
Dependent Variable Log per capita Expenditure 
1993 Cross-Section 1998 Cross-Section 
coef s.e. t-stat coef s.e. t-stat 
Constant 6.3707 0.242*** 26.34 5.5694 0.274*** 20.34 
Natal -0.5650 0.153 *** -3.70 -0.0748 0.074 -1.02 
(1) if urban 0.2889 0.119** 2.44 0.2850 0.080*** 3.57 
(1) if black -0.9748 0.141 *** -6.92 -0.9728 0.093 *** -10.47 
household size -0.0995 0,009*** -11.27 -0.0968 0.007 *** -14.28 
average 0.0571 0.011 *** 5.37 0.0877 0.008*** 10.92 
education 
(1) if male 0.1274 0.043 *** 2.93 0.1021 0.032*** 3.17 
head 
age of head 0.0053 0.007 0.71 0.0052 0.010 0.54 
age of head 0.0000 0.000 -0.40 0.0000 0.000 -0.01 
squared 
Household SC 0.0013 0.001 1.16 0.0069 0.001 *** 5.98 
Index 
Community -0.0046 0.005 -0.86 0.0068 0.004 * 1.89 
SC Index ' 
N 1175 1175 
R-squared 0.56 0.63 
F-Test SC 1.2 25.7 
variables 
p-value [0.30] [0.00] 
Notes : *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 
Ordinary least squares estimates with robust standard errors allowing for clustering at 
the community level. 
Household and community measures of social capital are individually and 
jointly insignificant in 1993. In 1998, however, both are positive and 
significant. To help interpret the effects, we calculate the point 
elasticities. For example, a 10 percent increase in either the household 
level or the community social capital index is associated with a 1.2 
percent increase in per capita expenditures. For comparison, a similar 
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increase in average education levels has an effect four times as large. This 
contrasts with Narayan and Pritchett (1997) and Grootaert (1998) who 
both find the effect of social capital to be larger than that of human 
capital in similar specifications. 
Have the dramatic changes in South Africa led to an increase in the value 
of social capital or are these results simply reflective of measurement 
error in our retrospective data? Above we discussed in detail why we 
believe the retrospective information on social capital to be reliable. 
Furthermore, the standard errors for the coefficients on household level 
social capital in 1993 and 1998 are the same, suggesting the estimates are 
not dramatically noisier in 1993. 
Instrumental variables estimation provides another possible way in which 
to evaluate the effect of measurement error on the estimated coefficients. 
Plausible instruments for individual level social capital are characteristics 
of local groups collected in the community survey. For example, the 
number of groups, or supply, might be expected to influence membership 
reflecting more opportunities to join similar to a price effect. Of course, 
the key question is whether these characteristics have a direct influence 
on per capita expenditures, beside that which operates through household 
level social capital, or are correlated with something that does and is not 
included in the regression. In the 1998 cross section, since community 
level social capital appears to be significant, this assumption would be 
inappropriate. For 1993, it also turns out to be invalid. Although the 
community variables do not apparently belong in the main equation, an 
overidentification test of the joint hypothesis that the underlying model is 
correctly specified and the instruments are valid, fails (Davidson & 
MacKinnon, 1993). We therefore are unable to instrument for household 
level social capital in either cross section. 
Given the apparent changes in coefficients on education and social capital 
between the two years, it may not be appropriate to estimate a standard 
fixed effects model, which assumes time invariant parameters. Therefore 
we estimate a household fixed effects model which allows time varying 
parameters and test whether there have been any structural changes. If the 
parameter estimates do not differ significantly over time, we can then 
consider the more efficient standard fixed effects model. Table 4 presents 
the estimation results of the following specification: 
yit = Xu P93 + dss+d9S Xu P Ma + (a, + su) (1) 
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Where Xit contains the set of controls (excluding the constant) used in 
Table 4, d98 is a dummy variable which is 0 in 1993 and 1 in 1998, and cg 
is an unobserved household level fixed effect9. The interpretation is that 
represents the effect of variables in 1993 while + J3A93 the effect in 
1998. 
Table 5 
Expenditure Function with Social Capital 
Fixed Effects and Time Interactions 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent Variable Log per capita Expenditure 
coef s.e. t-stat 
household size -0.0888 0.017*** -5.21 
average education -0.0052 0.010 -0.53 
(1) if male head 0.0950 0.058 1.64 
age of head 0.0146 0.017 0.87 
age of head squared -0.0002 0.000 -1.03 
Household SC Index -0.0003 0.001 -0.24 
Community SC Index -0.0017 0.006 -0.12 
(1) if Year 1998 -0.5598 0.275** -2.0 
Interacted with 1998 
household size -0.0053 0.010 -0.54 
average education 0.0470 0.010*** 4.83 
(1) if male head -0.0121 0.047 -0.26 
age of head 0.0034 0.012 0.30 
age of head squared 0.0000 0.000 -0.13 
Household SC Index 0.0052 0.001 *** 3.82 
Community SC Index 0.0008 0.006 0.14 
N=2350 
F-test all variables 17.1 [0.00] 
F-test 1998 Interactions 6.1 10.001 
Notes : *** 1% ** 5% * 10% P-values in brackets. Robust standard errors allowing 
for clustering at the community level. Regression also includes household level fixed 
effects. 
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The top panel of Table 5 presents the estimates of and the bottom 
panel, below the heading 'Interacted with 1998', estimates of Pa. The first 
finding is that after controlling for household level fixed effects, the 
estimated effects of gender and the age quadratic of the household head 
are no longer significant, in part because they change little over time. 
Household size remains negatively significant, is similar in magnitude to 
estimates from the cross sections, and does not vary over time. Average 
adult education no longer has a significant impact in 1993 though it is 
positive and significant in 1998. 
As the South African economy has opened up and the various restrictions 
on property rights, labour, and capital markets have been lifted, it appears 
that returns to education are rising. Turned around, in 1993 when the 
economy was less open, education was not associated with per capita 
expenditures, at least for the African and Indian populations. 
Household level social capital remains insignificant in 1993 and 
significant in 1998, though its estimated effect has declined by 25 percent 
relative to the 1998 cross sectional estimate. Community level social 
capital remains insignificant in 1993 and is now no longer significant in 
1998. Once again comparing the impact of a 10 percent change in 1998 
household social capital or education on per capita expenditures it is 0.9 
percent and 2.7 percent respectively. 
An important concern in this analysis is that the measure of household 
level social capital, based on group membership, is likely to be 
endogenous to per capita expenditures. While it may be that joining 
groups has a positive impact on one's income, it is also possible that some 
groups are akin to consumption goods and thus having more income leads 
one to join more groups. In other words it may be that the underlying 
structural model is such that per capita expenditures and group 
membership are simultaneously determined. In terms of the specification 
used above, what makes social capital endogenous is its potential 
correlation with the unobserved error term, (aj+Sji). 
One innovation in this paper, possible with the panel data, is that we 
control for fixed effects avoiding biases due to unobserved time invariant 
heterogeneity (a,), one form of (statistical) endogeneity. Indeed, when we 
do, the coefficient on social capital decreases, consistent with there 
having been a positive bias. Having removed the potential correlation 
between social capital and ah there still may remain correlation with Sjt 
19 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INCOME GENERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1993-98 
within periods. Our hypothesis is that the correlation, if it exists, is 
positive leading to upward bias in the coefficient estimates. 
Therefore, since the estimates of the effect of household and community 
social capital in 1993 and community level social capital in 1998 are 
insignificant (and have small point coefficients) we doubt these are as 
contaminated by endogeneity. Controlling for individual (and thus 
community) level fixed effects, then, the 1993 individual and community 
and 1998 community level variables may now be valid instruments for 
1998 individual level social capital. We exploit this to assess the impact 
of endogeneity of household level social capital in 1998. 
First, we re-estimate the specification from Table 5 excluding the three 
insignificant social capital variables (household and community social 
capital levels, community social capital interacted with the 1998 dummy 
variable) and retaining only the interaction of year 1998 and household 
social capital. Excluding these (insignificant) variables leaves the other 
results unchanged (results not shown). We then instrument for 1998 
social capital using four instruments: 1) lagged 1993 household level 
social capital 2 - 4 ) interactions of average education, head age, and head 
age squared with the total number of groups in the community measured 
in the community questionnaire. Finally, to ensure the instruments are not 
picking up community level effects we also include cluster dummy 
variables in each of the 69 clusters (in other words, interactions of year 
and cluster). 
The first stage regressions indicate all the instruments are very strong 
predictors of household level social capital, particularly lagged social 
capital (not shown). An overidentification test fails to reject the joint 
hypothesis that the underlying model is correctly specified and the 
instruments are valid with a p-value of 0.41 (Davidson & MacKinnon, 
1993)10. The results of the two-stage least squares estimation are 
presented in Table 6. 
The negative effects of household size remain strong in 1993 and are now 
somewhat larger compared with those in Table 5. The impact of 
education has declined but remains significant in only for 1998. Focusing 
on the household social capital index in 1998, it remains significant and 
the point estimate is nearly identical to that in Table 5. As before, a 10 
percent increase in the index suggests an increase of 1 percent in per 
capita expenditures, about Vz the effect of education for this specification. 
Above we have shown that the effect of household level social capital on 
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per capita expenditures is robust to a suite of controls for household fixed 
effects, community fixed and time varying effects, and contemporaneous 
correlation with the error term in the expenditure function. It less clear 
whether there is a similar impact at the community level, perhaps driven 
by spillover effects. The evidence in Table 5 suggested that community 
level effects are not present but given the difficulties of instrumenting for 
both household and community level social capital we are unable to 
further evaluate that claim. 
Recasting the model: What else can we learn? 
With only two periods, the fixed effects model with time varying 
parameters estimated in Table 5 can be recast into a first differences 
model. (Recent research following this line include Glewwe and Hall, 
1995, Grootaert, Kanbur, and Oh, 1997.) Since the models are linear, 
estimation in either form yields identical results. While on one level this 
is simply a mathematical result, it offers an alternative interpretation 
examining the changes in per capita income over the period. In particular, 
if we change the time interaction to 1993, thus using ds3 instead of d?s in 
equation (1) and subtract each household observation for 1993 from the 
A yt = A Xi P9S - d9i ~ X, 93 f3A93 + A Si (2) 
corresponding observation in 1998, we get the following: 
where A represents first differences over time (except when a subscript 
for (3). Ignoring the constant and error terms, this is an approximate 
decomposition of the changes in y into one part due to changes in X and 
another due to changes in the parameters (-/T^)11. If, as we have found, 
social capital is valuable in 1998, one can think of this value as being due 
in part to changes in the stock of social capital, AX (provided it can be 
accumulated) and in part to the initial 1993 stock which is 're-valued' in 
1998. Even if there were no change in social capital over the period, it 
would yield benefits due to the structural change. Essentially, the 
changing environment has provided the opportunity for initial levels of 
social capital to matter. 
Since the models are identical we present only the education and social 
capital coefficients from the specification presented in Table 5 to 
illustrate this interpretation. 
21 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INCOME GENERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1993-98 
Table 6 
Recasting the Model 
098 (s.e.) -Pa93 (s.e.) 
Household SC Index 0.0050 
(0.0017)*** 
0.0046 
(0.001)*** 
Average Education 0.0424 
(0.0100)*** 
0.0516 
(0.010)*** 
The structural changes in South Africa have led to increased 'returns' for 
both social and human capital. In 1993 these had no apparent return (Pgs + 
Pa93) but in 1998 they have a large and significant return (pgo). This does 
not mean, however, that initial levels are of no use, the changes in 
structure have made them useful. To the extent we can think of this as a 
capital accumulation process, then, we can argue that initial levels matter 
- the changing environment has effectively made them valuable. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
South Africa is an economy in transition as it undergoes the economic, 
political, and social changes effected by the transition to democratic 
governance and the accompanying liberalisation of its economy. The 
opening of new opportunities, in part due to lifting of the various legal 
restrictions on labour and capital markets, property rights, and residential 
location that underlay the policy of apartheid, suggests that there will be 
structural shifts in the economy and, as a result, changes in the returns to 
various factors of production. This paper, using a panel of household 
level data, begins to explore some of these shifts in South Africa's largest 
province. 
Estimating household level per capita expenditure functions, with the 
spotlight focused on an indicator of social capital, we find that there have 
been substantial changes over the period. Whereas education and social 
capital had no apparent return for households in 1993, they do yield 
substantial returns in 1998. In conjunction with the increased mobility 
documented in Maluccio, Thomas, and Haddad (1999), these findings are 
consistent with changes leading to a more efficient economy. The effect 
of household level social capital is significant, but substantially smaller 
than that of education in most of the specifications. 
The aim of this paper was to determine the causal relationship between 
membership in formal and informal groups and household welfare as 
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proxied by expenditures. The formulation of an index of group 
membership, which we refer to as social capital, was deliberately 
inclusive and did not distinguish by group function, characteristics of 
groups, length of group membership, or who in the household is a 
member. To some extent this is a weakness in the analysis, particularly if 
one is interested in evaluating possible policy responses. Grootaert (1998) 
begins an effort to do this separating groups by function and separating 
out the various characteristics and finds evidence that different 
characteristics do matter for different groups. Since membership is known 
at the individual level in the KwaZulu-Natal data, an additional 
possibility is to disaggregate the effects of social capital by gender. While 
this represents one direction for future research, it must be balanced with 
the need to endogenise social capital where possible, limiting to a large 
extent how many measures one can include in any single specification. 
A second direction of future research involves moving away from the 
group membership measures of social capital to other possible measures. 
The KIDS survey attempted to quantify social capital in four ways other 
than via group membership. First among these is through measures of 
family networks and their use. For example, it may be that family 
networks and group memberships are substitutes in the household's set of 
strategies. On the other hand, those with large family networks may be 
the best at building other (group based) networks. In the end this is an 
empirical question, which we think these data can address. The other 
measures of social capital included measures of trust, civic engagement, 
and violence. 
Lastly, Cross, Mngadi, and Mbhele (1998) report the results of qualitative 
research in KwaZulu-Natal that found an important role for social capital, 
particularly in household responses to economic shocks. For example, 
individuals frequently used their networks to access capital both for 
consumption smoothing as well as for investment such as the start up of 
small income generation projects. The 1998 household survey collected 
information on a variety of shocks that households experienced since the 
earlier survey and we intend to examine the hypothesis that households 
with more social capital are better able to absorb these shocks. 
NOTES 
1 The 1998 re-survey was directed by a consortium including the 
University of Natal, the University of Wisconsin, and the 
International Food Policy Research Institute. The choice of 
KwaZulu-Natal was in part the result of practical considerations 
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including a confluence of research interests, resources, and the 
feasibility of locating the households interviewed in 1993. The 
survey is called the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study or 
KIDS. 
2 'African' here excludes the 'coloured' and Indian (or Asian) 
populations 
3 Given the sensitive nature of politics in KwaZulu-Natal, questions 
regarding political organisations were kept rather general to avoid 
jeopardising the interview. These groups appear to be under-reported 
in the data. 
4 Households are defined using the 1993 PLSLD survey definition. A 
household member is someone who (a) lived in the surveyed 
dwelling 15 days out of preceding year and (b) shared food from a 
common source during their residence and (c) contributed to or 
shared from a common resource pool during their residence. A 
further distinction was made in the survey for resident household 
members as those who had lived in the dwelling for at least 15 days 
out of the preceding 30 days. Measures in this research are based on 
this latter definition - resident household members. All members in 
four households died over the period so they are excluded from the 
analysis. 
5 These comparisons are made using total monthly expenditures 
measured in 1993 Rand divided by the number of resident household 
members. The deflation factor for the 1998 survey is 1.372 based on 
the South African consumer price index. There are few differences 
between this approach and one using community level Laspeyres 
price indices calculated from price data collected in the community 
survey. 
6 Of course, one of the benefits of collecting panel data is to avoid the 
need to ask difficult retrospective questions. Nonetheless it is usually 
necessary to have some longer-term recall and can often be useful, 
eg., for validation and assessment of measurement error. 
7 Formally, the reliability ratio with x representing the true variable 
q o o 
and v the (random) measurement error is ax / (a x + a v )• 
8 Grootaert also includes measures of meeting attendance, fees, 
democratic participation, and whether the group was founded by the 
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community in his index of social capital. Unfortunately, the latter 
two measures are not available in these data. 
9 Random effects estimation was also considered but rejected on the 
basis of a Hausman test. 
10 Excluding lagged social capital from the instrument set increases the 
estimated effect of social capital, further reducing concern that it is 
an invalid instrument, but also substantially decreases the precision 
of the estimates and social capital is no longer significant. Estimates 
without instrumenting (but still controlling for cluster effects in 
1998) are about 10 percent larger than those presented in Table 6. 
11 This does not, however, give us any insight into dynamics or the 
effect of initial values on changes per se. This should not be 
surprising since the model only allows for contemporaneous effects 
of X on y. 
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